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Indeed, according to Western estimates the CMEA countries' net hard currency indebtedness has increased from $ 7 bn to about $ 50 bn in the seven-years period 1970-1977 (see Table 1 ). Of the total, about 30% is accounted for by the Soviet Union and 25% by Poland. In the course of the past year CMEA debt is likely to have been * HWWA -Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung -Hamburg. The article reproduces some findings of a study prepared for the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The views expressed are the sole responsibility of the authors and they sh.ould not be considered as reflecting the official position or endorsement of OECD member countries or of the Secretariat. The complete study will be published this summer by Verlag Weltarehiv GmbH, Hamburg.
augmented by another $ 6-8 bn, raising its level to about $ 55-60 bn net. Of the total net debt expansion of about $ 45 bn between 1970 and 1977, $ 33 bn fall into the second half of the period , and $ 13 bn into one year (1975) . Whereas the growth of indebtedness accelerated until 1975 it has slowed down since then, both in absolute and relative terms. Yet, the level and growth of CMEA debt remain high enough to call for the continued attention of policymakers and banks. 
CMEA
The most important single element in (the rise of) hard currency debt has been liabilities to Western banks. Bank financing is accounting for an estimated 63% of the CMEA's gross liabilities and 58% of the group's net liabiliti.es to the West (end-1977) . Again, expansion was most pronounced, both in gross and net terms, in 1975 (see Table 2 ). In 1976 gross indebtedness increased at a somewhat slower rate (except for the GDR, Hungary and -due to its very low initial debt level -the CSSR); at the same time deposits in the West were generally augmented noticeably. However, it was not before 1977 that a major change took place. In that year, CMEA countries' gross bank indebtedness did not rise by more than $ 4.1 bn, and net indebtedness by only $ 3.9 bn.
The slower pace of borrowing in 1977 appears mainly to reflect the CMEA countries' growing concern about the levels of their hard currency indebtedness and the rates of their increases. Reluctance to lend on the part of Western banks does not seem to have played a dominant role. In 1978 liabilities to Western banks were again accelerating: in the first half they expanded by $ 4.1 bn net.
Indebtedness to banks encompasses a great variety of CMEA liabilities: one-day call or term money and other Euromoney-market instruments; irrevocable and unconditional 1/2-5 years prom issory notes bought by Western banks from exporters on a non-recourse basis; 6-8 years syndicated Euro-currency loans; officially guaranteed 
buyer credits (at fixed or floating interest rates) of up to 8 years maturity and more; and 8-15 years bonds kept in the banks' own portfoliosto mention just a few. Whereas most Euro-currency loans represent in fact untied balance-ofpayments financing (irrespective of the stated loan purpose) as do funds raised in the money market or by bonds issues, other sources of bank finance are tied to goods purchases in the respective country. On the whole the rapid growth in bank indebtedness since the early Seventies indicates the CMEA countries' desire of -and success in -securing more funds for universal use.
Different Fund-raising Strategies
Most successful in this respect has been Hungary, the country with the highest proportion of bank credits (over 90%). There, the authorities are reportedly taking the view that by offering cash payment for their goods purchases their bargaining position with regard to prices, delivery terms, etc., is substantially improved. They have therefore completely separated the purchasing of imports from their financing, the foreign exchange being pro-vided by the National Bank which for this purpose is tapping the Euro-currency market. In contrast to this positive interpretation of the Hungarian practice it has also been argued that the country because of its relatively low share of machinery imports -the lowest in the CMEA -may not be able to raise more officially supported export credits in the West. In any case the National Bank has been able to attract substantial amounts at favourable rates in the Eurocredit and Eurobond markets, i.e. in the form of untied balanceof-payments finance.
Turning to the USSR, Poland and the GDR, countries closer to the CMEA average proportion of bank liabilities, their structure of indebtedness can be explained by several factors: a financial strategy making deliberate use of the often low interest rates and credit periods of official export finance; a larger share of plant and machinery, qualifying for such financing, in total imports from the West; certain difficulties in raising sufficient "untied" Euro-currency funds to cover their scheduled trade deficits. All interpretations have some plausibility. In addition, in the case of the notes, and bank loans and credits tied to specific trade transactions). Balance-of-payments financing on an untied basis via syndicated Euro-currency loans and credits is a relatively advanced method of macroeconomic financial management (as is the issuance of bonds in the international market or active participation in money market operations). It appears, therefore, that it is not only the commodity structure of imports from the West which accounts for their low share of bank liabilities but a certain lack of financial flexibility and sophistication, too.
Large Proportion of Euro-currency Financing
About two thirds of Western banks' total exposure to CMEA countries represent foreign currency lending (see Table 3 ). Of the domestic currency portion of $ 12.6 bn (year-end 1977), 37% was 
CMEA
accounted for by German banks, another 9% each by banks domiciling in the US and in London. The Swiss share is probably near $1 bn. The balance of about $ 5 bn is made up by banks in other countries. The picture is somewhat distorted by the fact that in Germany officially supported export credits extended by banks (buyer credits) are recorded among banks' claims on foreigners whereas in most other countries they are treated as claims on the official export finance (and guarantee) institutions, e.g. in Britain the ECGD (Export Credits Guarantee Department).
As to Euro-currency lending, 35% of the banks total claims on CMEA of $ 25.7 bn at year-end 1977 (viz $ 8.9 bn) were held by London banks, another $ 3.0 bn by banks in Luxembourg and $ 1.9 bn by banks in Vienna. Of the remaining $ 11.9 bn, the exposure of German and Italian banks was accounting for $ 1.7 bn, exposure of banks in Belgium,, the Netherlands and Switzerland for another $ 3.5-4 bn. The most important financial centre next to London for Euro-currency business with CMEA countries is no doubt Paris, with an estimated $ 5.5-6 bn claims at year-end 1977. CMEA countries' deposits with Western banks have continually been rising until end-1977, al-though in the course of the years as well as among individual countries some fluctuations are observable. More than 80% of total CMEA deposits are held on the Euromarkets. About one third of the Euro-currency position is with London and Luxembourg banks, some 8% with banks in Vienna and a major part of the rest is likely to be held in Paris.
It is mainly due to the important German position in East-West trade that Frankfurt has become a major centre of CMEA financing. The same is true for Luxernbourg where most of the supplementary Euro-currency financing of German exports is undertaken. Besides that, Luxembourg has developed to become a financial centre of its own right, with close connections to the other Euromarket centres (notably London and Paris'). In Paris, too, export-related medium and long-term Euro-currency financing (of French exports) appears to be of major importance. In addition to that, however, a great deal of "genuine" short-term Euro-currency trading with Socialist countries is taking place there. It is not only the "Eurobank" (Banque Commerciale pour I'Europe du Nord), the largest Eastern banking establishment in the West, but also the French banks themselves which are actively participating in this business. London is CMEA beyond any doubt the major centre for both shortterm Euro-currency trading and medium-term syndicated loan financing. US banks, the major providers of "untied" balance-of-payments financing, are operating from London. It is therefore due to "objective" factors that London is accounting for a high proportion of the CMEA countries' total financial business with the West. The maturity distribution of banks' claims to CMEA countries and the unused credit commitments at year-end 1977 are shown in Table 4 . Judged by these data, the situation does not appear to give rise to serious concern. A large proportion of the claims which expired in 1978 were current credits, partly on a daily call basis, the sum of which is in practice "never" called, however. Also, mail credits and short-term money deposits with banks in Socialist countries go into this position. Therefore the figures for 1978 look much worse than they actually are. The amounts falling due in 1979, 1980 and thereafter appear generally to be manageable given the improvement in most CMEA countries' trade accounts. This statement holds also when interest payments -not included in the figures -are added. The only country which on the basis of these data may be facing difficulties, is Poland: $ 1.4 bn of its bank liabilities are due for repayment in 1979, $ 4.0 bn in 1980 and thereafter.
However, the table provides a partial picture only: it is confined to the maturity distribution of CMEA countries' bank indebtedness. Liabilities to Western non-banks which may account for up to 70 % of a country's total hard-currency indebtedness are not included. Information on the maturity structure of officially supported export credits, the major component of non-bank indebtedness, is not available.
Positive Attitude of Western Bankers
Bankers are generally taking a rather positive view on lending to CMEA borrowers. Under the present conditions of abundant bank liquidity and slack credit demand from first-rate corporate borrowers, lending to the CMEA appears superior to most alternatives. In interviews with numerous bankers we found no serious doubts as to the willingness and ability of CMEA countries to keep their hard-currency indebtedness under control and to service their debts as accurately in future as in the past. Moratoria or demands for debt renegotiations by either an individual CMEA country or the bloc as a whole are practically being ruled out. The idea that any CMEA country should default by accident (i.e. by economic mismanagement) and that the USSR and other members of the group would remain passive in this event is considered a most unlikely possibility. However, no bank would drive the "umbrella" theory so far as to dispense with making individual country assessments and defining, however vaguely, a "desirable" lending structure.
CMEA countries are generally considered as being financially conservative (though at varying degrees), with an inherent reluctance to enter into continuous, large trade and current account deficits and to accumulate large external debts. Neither the level nor the more recent growth of foreign indebtedness are regarded as being excessive (with the possible exception of Poland). The level of debt is considered moderate not only in relation to the CMEA countries' economic potential but also to foreign indebtedness of certain developing countries. The heavy trade deficits in 1973, 1974 and especially in 1975 and the resulting fast increase in hard-currency debts are looked upon as being to some degree accidental. The reduction of the CMEA deficit in 1976 and more in 1977 is generally interpreted as signalling a return to a more "normal" structure of the current account.
It is an open question whether the CMEA countries will continue their policy of reducing their trade deficits with the West in 1979 and thereafter. The CMEA's need for Western technology is certainly unchangedly high and even growing, given their ambitious economic goals. Indeed, it is not sure but quite likely that CMEA countries will again accelerate their borrowing in the near future -possibly on the basis of a new borrowing concept. The principle of self-liquidating credits may become still more important than in recent years. The request for compensation deals is also likely to increase considerably.
